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The Colorado River Compact: A





The Colorado River is one of the most
physically developed and controlled rivers in the nation.
It is also one of the more water-deficient systems with
a service area that extends far beyond its physical
drainage area. Despite its relatively meager water
supply, a larger percent of water is exported from the
Colorado River system than from any other major river
system in the United States. Although the water supply
of the river is arguably adequate to meet the
quantitative needs today and in the immediate future of
both the Upper and Lower Basin, severe problems currently
exist related to water shortage. Most resource
development undertakings require an assured supply of
water for at least 40 years in order to justify making
the initial investments. Thus, the fact that there is
no actual shortage of water today or in the immediate
future is of little comfort to those whose future depends
upon an assured and adequate supply of water for the next
40 to 50 years.	 See U.S. Department of Interior,
Westwide Study Report on Critical Water Problems Facing
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this presentation is to discuss three areas of law which
affect the usable water supply of the Colorado River:
the Mexican Treaty of 1944, salinity control measures,
and the Federal Endangered Species Act of 1973; and to
explore why the Colorado River Basin is a breeding ground
for controversy.
A. The Law of the River
The waters of the Colorado River have been
divided among the Upper Basin, the Lower Basin, the
Republic of Mexico, and among the states of the Upper and
Lower Basins by a set of compacts, treaties, statutes,
and judicial decisions, collectively referred to as "the
law of the river." What follows is a summary of the
principal components of the law of the river.
1. The Colorado River Compact of 1922 
The Colorado River Compact of 1922 ("1922
Compact") divides the entire Colorado River System, which
by definition includes all tributaries of the Colorado
River, into an Upper and a Lower Basin. The boundary
between the two is at Lee's Ferry, Arizona, which was
considered by the compact commissioners to be the natural
dividing point between the tributaries of the Upper and
Lower Basin states. The Upper Basin states are Colorado,
Utah, and Wyoming; the Lower Basin states are Arizona,
California, Nevada, and New Mexico. In essence the 1922
Compact accomplishes the following:
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a. Article III(a) apportions for annual
00"
beneficial consumptive use 7.5 anion acre feet
("m.a.f.") of the flows of the Colorado River System to
each Basin. Article III(b) gives the Lower Basin the
right to increase its beneficial consumptive use by 1
m.a.f. per year.
b. Article III(c) provides that if the
United States thereafter recognizes in the Republic of
Mexico any right to use the waters of the Colorado River
System, such waters shall be supplied first from any
surplus flows above the aggregate of quantities allocated
in Articles III(a) and (b); if such surplus is insuffi-
cient, then the deficiency shall be borne equally by the
es*" Upper and Lower Basins. Whenever necessary the Upper
Basin must deliver at Lee's Ferry water to supply one-
half of the deficiency.
c. Article III(d) provides that the Upper
Basin shall not cause the flow of the river at Lee's
Ferry to be depleted below an aggregate of 75 m.a.f. in
any consecutive ten-year period.
2. The Boulder Canyon Proiect Act of 1928 
The Boulder Canyon Project Act of 1928,
43 U.S.C. § 617 (1928) ("Boulder Canyon Act"), authorized
the construction of the Hoover Dam and Powerplant and the
All-American Canal between Imperial Dam on the lower
river and the Imperial and Coachella Valleys. It also
provided that before the 1922 Compact would become
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effective, all seven states had to ratify it, or that six
states, including California, ratify; and that California
enact legislation limiting itself to no more than 4.4
m.a.f. of the 7.5 m.a.f. apportioned to the Lower Basin
states by Article III(a), plus not more than one-half of
the surplus water unapportioned by the 1922 Compact. The
latter was accomplished in the California Limitation Act
of 1929.
The Boulder Canyon Act also pre-approved any compact
which Arizona, California, and Nevada might enter into
apportioning, of the Article III(a) water, 300,000 acre-
feet to Nevada, 2.8 m.a.f. to Arizona, and 4.4 m.a.f. or
less to California; allowing Arizona exclusive beneficial
use of the waters of the Gila River; exempting the Gila
River's Arizona tributaries from any obligation to supply
water to Mexico under Article III(c); and requiring that
any Mexican burden be borne equally by California and
Arizona from mainstream water. Finally, the Boulder
Canyon Act authorized the Secretary of the Interior to
execute contracts for water made available by Hoover Dam,
subject to the terms of the 1922 Compact.
3. The Mexican Treaty of 1944 
Article X of the "Treaty...Relating to
Waters of the Colorado and Tijuana Rivers and of the Rio
Grande" ("Mexican Treaty") guarantees an annual delivery
of 1.5 m.a.f. of water to Mexico and an additional amount
up to a total of 1.7 m.a.f. if there is a surplus. In
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the event of extraordinary drought or serious accident
to the United States , irrigation system, the Mexican
Treaty allows the United States to reduce the delivery
below 1.5 m.a.f. in the same proportion as consumptive
uses in the United States are reduced.
4. The Upper Colorado River Basin Compact of
1948 
The Upper Colorado River Basin Compact of
1948 apportions the water allocated to the Upper Basin
by the 1922 Compact as follows: Colorado, 51.75%; Utah,
23%; Wyoming, 14%; and New Mexico, 11.25%. Arizona,
whose northeast corner drains into the Upper Basin, was
given a flat 50,000 acre feet per year.
5. The Colorado River Storage Proiect Act of
1956
The Colorado River Storage Project Act of
1956, 43 U.S.C. § 620 (1982), authorized the construction
and operation of several long-term carryover reservoir
storage units in the Upper Basin, including the initial
phase of the Central Utah Project, which assist the Upper
Basin to make required deliveries of water to the Lower
Basin and also to maximize the consumptive use of its own
1922 Compact-apportioned water. This act also
established the Upper Colorado River Basin Fund to which
operating revenues are credited and provided a percentage
formula to distribute surplus moneys to each Upper Basin
state.
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6. Arizona v. California
In 1952 Arizona brought a suit under the
original jurisdiction of the United States Supreme Court
to determine, among other things, its right to divert 1.2
m.a.f. of mainstream water at Lake Havasu for use in the
Phoenix and Tucson areas as a part of the Central Arizona
Project ("CAP"). Contrary to California's contentions,
the Court rejected both the law of prior appropriation
and the doctrine of equitable apportionment as a basis
for its decision and held that by passing the Boulder
Canyon Act, Congress had created a means of statutorily
apportioning the mainstream waters of the Colorado River
among California, Arizona, and Nevada. Arizona v. 
California, 373 U.S. 546 (1963). In the Court's opinion,
of the 7.5 m.a.f. of water apportioned to the Lower Basin
by the 1922 Compact, the Boulder Canyon Act allocated 2.8
m.a.f. to Arizona, 4.4 m.a.f. to California, and 300,000
acre feet to Nevada, while allowing Arizona and Nevada
exclusive use of their tributaries. If there was any
surplus water in the mainstream, half of it would go to
California and half to Arizona. In the event of a
shortage of mainstream water, the Secretary of the
Interior was to equitably prorate the deficiency.
7. Colorado River Basin Project Act of 1968
The Colorado River Basin Project Act of
1968, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1501 et seq. (1982)("Basin Project
Act") , authorized the construction of a number of federal
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projects, including the CAP, but directed the Secretary
of the Interior to administer the CAP so that California
never receives less than 4.4 m.a.f. Congress further
recognized that the Colorado River System contained too
little water to satisfy the Mexican Treaty burden and
also to accommodate the growing needs of the Upper and
Lower Basins. Without augmentation of the water of the
river by 2.5 m.a.f., Congress stated that the Colorado
River Basin was in danger of economic stagnation. The
Secretary of the Interior was directed to investigate
augmentation, primarily by importation from other basins
or desalinization. Because of objections of represen-
tatives of the Northwest, however, examination of water
importation was suspended until at least 1988. The Basin
Project Act also declared that satisfaction of the
requirements of the Mexican Treaty from the Colorado
River constitutes a national obligation and that the
seven Basin States would be relieved of the Mexican
Treaty obligation as soon as an augmentation plan for an
additional 2.5 m.a.f. was implemented.
8. Minute 242 
Minute 242 of the International Boundary
and Water Commission, signed by the United States and
Mexico on August 30, 1973, commits the United States to
deliver water to Mexico from the mainstream containing
on the average no more than 115 parts per million more
than the salt content of the water used by the Imperial
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Valley. This standard generally limits the salt content
to about 1000 parts per million.
9. Colorado River Basin Salinity Control Act
of 1974
The Colorado River Basin Salinity Control
Act of 1974, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1571 et seq. (1982) ("salinity
Control Act"), was enacted in order to implement Minute
242. The Salinity Control Act initially authorized four
salinity control projects and has been amended to
authorize numerous others, most of which are located in
the Upper Basin. The Salinity Control Act also sanctions
an array of other methods to control salinity, including
canal lining, projects to reduce the return flow of
particularly saline irrigation water, and the circumven-
tion or deflection of saline water from natural sources.
The Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251 et seq.
(1982), also pertains to the salinity problem in the
Colorado Basin. It authorizes the United States to fix
effluent standards governing the amount of pollutants
that can be released from "point sources," such as
conduits and ditches, and to control such discharges
through a permit system. The Clean Water Act also
authorizes the United States to control the general water
quality of streams.
10. Colorado River Basin Salinity Control
Fort=
Although no federal legislation has
designated a Basinwide authority to manage salinity
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control efforts, in 1973 the Basin states organized the
Colorado River Basin Salinity Control Forum ("Forum").
In 1975 the Forum established Basinwide salinity stan-
dards and developed a plan of salinity control which
emphasizes the construction of the federally-funded
projects authorized by the Salinity Control Act. The
Forum's approach has withstood a court challenge by the
Environmental Defense Fund under the Clean Water Act and
the National Environmental Policy Act. See Environmental
Defense Fund v. Castle, 657 F.2d 275 (D.C.Cir. 1981).
B. General References
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II. MEXICAN TREATY OF 1944
The drafters of the 1922 Compact anticipated that
a resolution of the international controversy between
Mexico and the United States concerning the waters of the
Colorado River might affect the allocations made in the
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1922 Compact. The drafters attempted to protect against
this risk by apportioning a lesser quantity of water than
they believed was physically present. Thus, the 1922
Compact provides that any commitment of water to Mexico
is to be supplied first from waters surplus to the 16
m.a.f. apportioned between the Upper and Lower Basins.
The problem is that the river fails to adhere to the
commands of man; it generates no surplus water.
A. The Problem
In 1944 the United States in the Mexican Treaty
committed itself to the delivery from the Colorado River
to Mexico of 1.5 m.a.f. annually, subject to the adjust-
ments discussed in Part I.A.3. above. According to the
provisions of the 1922 Compact, this water was to be
supplied from the waters which are surplus to the
aggregate of waters apportioned in Article III(a) and
(b), which is 16 m.a.f.; 7.5 m.a.f. to the Upper Basin
and 8.5 m.a.f. to the Lower Basin. However, the actual
sustained water supply of the river since 1930 has not
been sufficient to yield the quantities of water antici-
pated by the drafters of the 1922 Compact, as well as
satisfying the United States' obligation under the
Mexican Treaty. The 1922 Compact provides for this
contingency by stating that the burden of any deficiency
in surplus waters must be borne equally by the Upper and
Lower Basins. In other words, to the extent that no
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surplus waters exist, the Upper and the Lower Basin are
each responsible for 750,000 a.f. annually.
Even though at the present time uses in the Upper
Basin have not depleted the flow of the river so as to
require curtailment of any Upper Basin use for purposes
of the 1922 Compact or the Mexican Treaty, what is
happening is that a portion of the waters which are
apportioned to the Upper Basin but presently unused are
being delivered at Lee's Ferry by federal authorities
expressly to furnish one-half of the Lower Basin's
Mexican Treaty obligation. Additionally, because federal
authorities seek to maximize power generating potential
in the Lower Basin, they typically release more than 8.25
m.a.f. (7.5 m.a.f. plus 750,000 a.f.). While this
administrative practice is probably consistent with
Article IV(c) of the 1922 Compact, which provides that
until a need for water in the Upper Basin materializes
the Upper Basin may not withhold water from an actual
need in the Lower Basin, it affords an opportunity for
overdraft on the water apportioned to the Lower Basin.
Although this presently may not cause actual shortages
in the Upper Basin, as development in the Upper Basin,
as well as in the Lower Basin, increases the draft on the
river, administration to satisfy the various entitlements
to the water is inevitable.
It is generally believed that the United States'
obligation under the Mexican Treaty is paramount; it
constitutes a first call on the Colorado River and most
agree that federal officials will take all necessary
steps to satisfy this obligation. The problem created
by the lack of sufficient water to satisfy all entitle-
ments raises a number of complex issues not all of which
are capable of resolution at this time. They include:
1. Are waters used from the Lower Basin
tributaries included in the calculation
of allowable beneficial consumptive uses
apportioned to the Lower Basin by Article
III(a) and (b).
2. If they are, then what contribution to the
Mexican Treaty obligation is imposed by
Article III(c) on the Lower Basin when
(a) beneficial consumptive uses in the
Lower Basin exceed 8.5 m.a.f.,
(b) the supply in the Lower Basin (by
including its tributaries) substan-
tially exceeds 8.5 m.a.f., and
(c) the actual demand for water in the
Upper Basin exceeds that available
after delivery of 75 m.a.f. in
successive ten year periods at Lee's
Ferry.
3. Must there be more water used in the
entire Colorado River System than the 16
m.a.f. apportioned by Article III(a) and
(b) before the Upper Basin can invoke
curtailment of Lower Basin uses in excess
of 8.5 m.a.f. in aid of any Mexican Treaty
obligation.
4. If yes, must the Upper Basin deliver more
than 750,000 a.f. at Lee's Ferry in order
to absorb "shrink" or transit loss
occurring in the river between Lee's Ferry
and the Mexican boundary.
This problem has been described by the United States
Comptroller General as follows:
-12-
A major dispute exists between
the Upper and Lower Basins over
supplying the 1.5 m.a.f. commitment
to Mexico. The Colorado River Com-
pact states that any required
delivery of water to Mexico shall be
supplied first from water surplus to
the basic apportionment from the
Colorado River system (7.5 m.a.f. to
the Upper Basin, 8.5 m.a.f. to the
Lower Basin) and if the surplus is
insufficient, the burden of such
deficiency shall be borne equally by
the two basins.
The Lower Basin States contend
that there is no surplus and the
Upper Basin's share of the Mexican
treaty delivery obligation is
therefore one-half of the total
obligation of 1.5 m.a.f. plus one-
half of the losses incurred in
delivering the water from Lee Ferry
to the Mexican border. The Upper
Basin States believe that surplus
water exists in the Lower Basin and
therefore they are not required to
release any water to meet the Mexican
treaty obligation.
Report to Congress of Comptroller General, May 4, 1979.
The problem is often referred to as "the Gila River
problem." Substantial quantities of water originate in
the tributaries of the Colorado River located in the
Lower Basin, principally the Gila River, which discharge
into the Colorado Rover at points below Lee's Ferry.
These tributary waters have been estimated to range
at quantities between 2 m.a.f. to 3.5 m.a.f. annually.
Arizona has reached a very high, if not full, state of
development with respect to the Gila River waters. To
the extent these tributary waters are included in the
accounting of "surplus" waters, it would materially
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increase the usable water supply in the Upper Basin as
the Upper Basin would be freed of a duty to release water
at Lee's Ferry for satisfaction of the Mexican Treaty
obligation.
It appears from an examination of the 1922 Compact
and the Boulder Canyon Project Act of 1928 that the Lower
Basin tributaries must be included in the determination
of whether a surplus exists. Resolution of 1) whether
the Upper Basin has a duty to contribute water toward the
Mexican Treaty obligation when the Lower Basin's uses
exceed 8.5 m.a.f. and the Lower Basin's uses do not reach
7.5 m.a.f. and 2) if the answer to number one is yes,
whether the Upper Basin must also supply additional water
to compensate for channel losses between Lee's Ferry and
the Mexican border is less clear although I believe that
the equities and the record of the 1922 Compact
negotiations clearly support the Upper Basin's positions.
B. Inclusion of the Lower Basin Tributaries
The Lower Basin's average annual use of water
from its tributaries from 1976-80, including possible
groundwater overdrafts in the Gila River system, has been
estimated at 4.5 m.a.f. U.S. Department of Interior,
Colorado River S st Cons •tive Uses a d Losses Re ort
1976-80, at 35-39 (Washington, D.C.). If that quantity
of water were added to the average virgin flow of the
Colorado River at Lee's Ferry from 1922 to 1985, the sum
would exceed 16 m.a.f. and would thus yield a surplus
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sufficient to satisfy the Mexican Treaty obligation
without a contribution from the upper Basin. The Lower
Basin, however, contends that its tributaries should not
be treated in this manner.
1. Probable Position of the Lower Basin
States
Relying on the language of Article III(c)
of the 1922 Compact and on the United States Supreme
Court decision in Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546
(1963), the Lower Basin contends that its tributaries are
excluded from the determination of whether surplus water
exists. The critical language of Article III(c) is:
If.. .the United States...shall...recognize...
in.. .Mexico any right to the use of waters of
the Colorado River System...such waters shall 
be supplied first from the waters which are
surplus over and above the aggregate of the 
quantities specified in paragranhs (a) and (b);
and if such surplus shall prove insufficient
...then, the burden of such deficiencies shall
be equally borne by the Upper Basin and the
Lower Basin...
(Emphasis added). The Lower Basin contends that Article
III(c) defines surplus water as the excess after the
aggregate of uses apportioned by Article III(a) and (b)
is reached. Since Article III(a) and (b) apportion a
total of 16 m.a.f. the Lower Basin contends that there
is a surplus only when the aggregate of uses in the Upper
and Lower Basin combined exceed 16 m.a.f. Since a supply
of 16 m.a.f. does not now exist, nor will it in the
foreseeable future, the Upper Basin and Lower Basin must
equally bear the Mexican Treaty obligation.
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The Lower Basin can be expected to argue that this
literal and technical reading of Article III(c) is
consistent with the decision in Arizona v. California 373
U.S. 546 (1963), in which the United States Supreme Court
held that Congress, in the Boulder Canyon Act, excluded
the Lower Basin tributaries from its statutory apportion-
ment among the Lower Basin states. The Court's decision
occurred in the face of the express language of section
4(a) of the Boulder Canyon Act which required that
California limit itself to 4.4 m.a.f. "of the waters
apportioned to the lower basin States by paragraph (a)
of Article III of the Colorado River Compact, plus not
more than one-half of any excess or surplus waters
unapportioned by said compact." Article III(a) of the
1922 Compact apportioned water from the "Colorado River
System" which is defined in Article II(a) as "that
portion of the Colorado River and its tributaries within
the United States." (Emphasis added). However, the
Supreme Court expressly stated that it was not deciding
any issue of interpretation of the 1922 Compact, and that
the controversy was to be disposed of solely on the
theory that Congress had made a statutory apportionment
between the states of the Lower Basin: 	 Arizona
California, and Nevada.
2. Reasons for Inclusion
Scrutiny of the Compact, the Boulder Canyon
Act, and even Arizona's past conduct leads to the con-
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clusion that the Lower Basin tributaries are to be
included in an Article III(a) determination of surplus.
First, however, before analyzing these factors, it must
also be noted that although the Supreme Court in Arizona
v. California scrupulously avoided a decision with
respect to Upper-Lower Basin issues, it did imply in
dictum that tributaries of the Colorado River were
comprehended by the 1922 Compact's apportionment scheme.
The Court states:
Arizona, because of her particularly strong
interest in the Gila, intensely resented the
Compact's inclusion of the Colorado River
tributaries in its allocation scheme and was
bitterly hostile to having Arizona tributaries,
again particularly the Gila, forced to con-
tribute to the Mexican burden.
Inclusion of the tributaries in the Compact was
natural in view of the upper States' strong
feeling that the Lower Basin tributaries should
be made to share the burden of any obligation
to deliver water to Mexico which a future
treaty might impose.
Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. at 558, 568. This
language indicates that the Supreme Court was aware of
the equities and concerns of the Upper Basin. Nonethe-
less, it must be remembered that this language is dictum
and does not dispose of the technical argument discussed
above.
a. 1922 Compact Language and Negotiations
The most persuasive proof that tributaries
are included under Article III(c) lies in the language
of the 1922 Compact itself which includes tributaries
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within the definition of the waters apportioned. Article
II(a) defines the "Colorado River System" as "that
portion of the Colorado River and its tributaries within
the United States." The record of the negotiations of
the 1922 Compact affirms this interpretation. The
definition of the Colorado River System was approved by
all the compact commissioners. Further, a review of the
record demonstrates that the commissioners understood
that the Lower Basin tributaries were subject to Article
III and to the Mexican Treaty obligation.
b. Boulder Canyon Act
Congress' intent in approving the 1922
Compact through the Boulder Canyon Act was clearly to
subject the Lower Basin tributaries to the demands of
Article III. During floor debate various senators
expressed the understanding that in the 1922 Compact the
Colorado River Basin embraces the tributaries as well as
the mainstream of the Colorado River. Senator Hayden
twice offered amendments to the pending statute to exempt
the Gila, except such return flows as might reach the
mainstream, from any obligation under the Mexican Treaty
and to allow Arizona exclusive beneficial use of the Gila
within the state. Both amendments were defeated.
c. Arizona's Past Conduct
Arizona initially opposed ratification of
the 1922 Compact for the primary reason that it included
Lower Basin tributaries for the purpose of determining
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an Article III(c) surplus. At the Denver Governor's
Conference in 1927, called by the upper Basin states to
try to settle differences between California and Arizona,
Arizona attempted to attach a condition that the
tributaries in Arizona be relieved from any burden which
might be impressed upon them by virtue of any treaty.
This condition was not adopted. Further, in the second
Arizona v. California, 292 U.S. 341 (1934), Arizona
argued before the United States Supreme Court that the
compact commissioners had agreed that the Colorado River
System included the Gila River and its tributaries and
that Article III(b), which gives the Lower Basin the
right to increase its beneficial consumptive use by 1
m.a.f. annually, was intended to go to Arizona to compen-
sate it for the waters of the Gila River and its
tributaries. All of these factors together conclusively
demonstrate that the tributaries of the Colorado River
are to be included in an Article III(c) determination of
surplus.
C. Lower Basin Uses in Excess of Its Apportionment
The Lower Basin's use of water from the
Colorado River System was estimated at approximately 10.6
m.a.f. in 1980. This is far in excess of its Article
III(a) and (b) apportionment of 8.5 m.a.f. The Upper
Basin contends that under the terms of Article III(c)
this excess use constitutes surplus and that accordingly,
the Upper Basin's duty to supply a portion of the Mexican
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Treaty obligation should be diminished to the extent of
the excess use. Thus, in a year such as 1980, the Upper
Basin would have no duty to supply any water under
Article III(c). Since the common belief at the time the
1922 Compact was negotiated was that the flow of the
Colorado River was adequate to satisfy all needs, there
is virtually nothing in the record of the compact
meetings or elsewhere that either confirms or refutes the
Upper Basin's contention. The Upper Basin's position
would seem to be contrary to the technical reading of
Article III(c). However, its underlying rationale
conforms to the intent of the compact commissioners to
equalize the Article III(a) apportionments to each basin
and to match the Upper Basin's delivery obligation
specified in Article III(d) to the amount of those
apportionments.
D. Channel Losses
The Lower Basin also charges that in addition
to one-half of the 1.5 m.a.f. required by the Mexican
Treaty, the Upper Basin must also deliver one-half of the
channel losses occurring to the water between Lee's Ferry
and Mexico. This issue was raised just twice during the
compact negotiations. The commissioners discussed
designating Yuma, Arizona, as the delivery point for
water due Mexico. Delph Carpenter, commissioner for the
State of Colorado, commented that such a designation
would have the effect of imposing an additional burden
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on the Upper Basin. The notion of locating the delivery
point at Yuma was subsequently abandoned.
Article III(c) states that the Upper Basin "shall
deliver at Lee Ferry water to supply one-half of the
deficiency." (Emphasis added). By specifically desig-
nating Lee's Ferry as the point of delivery, the 1922
Compact expressly relieves the Upper Basin of any duty
to compensate for channel losses occurring below that
point. So far as the Upper Basin is concerned, Lee's
Ferry is where the delivery of water in satisfaction of
any Mexican Treaty obligation is to be made; the fate of
the water below that point is not its responsibility.
III. Salinity
A major concern both in the United States and in
Mexico is the threat of salinity. The impact of the ever
increasing levels of salinity in the waters of the
Colorado River is felt to a varying degree by all users -
agricultural, municipal, and industrial. It is generally
assumed that a relatively high salinity level lowers crop
yields, intensifies the need for special on-fan drainage
facilities, increases water treatment costs, damages
plumbing and fixtures, and increases maintenance on pumps
and distribution systems. The federal government has
invested millions of dollars in salinity control although
the exact magnitude of the benefits of this effort is
uncertain, raising policy questions for lawmakers, water
managers, and basin residents.
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A. Historical Information
The Colorado River, like many of the rivers of
the west, had a relatively high salinity content due to
natural sources even prior to any use of the waters by
man. The Colorado River Basin is a former sea bed. When
the sea dried up, the salt deposits remained; as a
result, much of the basin is underlain by highly saline
shales. High salinity concentrations in the water
result from two general processes: salt loading, or the
addition of soluble salts to the river, and salt concen-
tration, caused by a reduction in the volume of river
water as a result of evaporation, transpiration, or
withdrawals of water. Almost one-half of the river's
salt loading is estimated to come from interaction of the
river with the basin's naturally saline soil and rocks.
In addition to precipitation percolating through the soil
and dissolving salts, the three million acres of irri-
gated farmland in the region add more soluble minerals
to the river as irrigation water leaches minerals from
cultivated soils. Salt concentrations in the river are
further increased by transpiration by plants and
evaporation of water from reservoirs. Exports of over
five million acre feet from the basin reduce the
potential for dilution downstream.
Salinity levels vary throughout the basin.
Generally, the Colorado River, at its headwaters in
north-central Colorado, has a salinity concentration of
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about 50 mg/L (milligrams per litre). The salinity
concentration progressively increases as the river flows
downstream. Recent record high flows have flushed and
filled the major reservoirs, resulting in significantly
lower salinity levels at Imperial Dam - from an annual
average of 826 mg/L in 1982 to 608 mg/L in 1985. Without
control measures, however, the salinity level is
projected to increase, possibly reaching a level of 1005
mg/L at Imperial Dam by about 2010.
Average salinity levels fail to give an accurate
picture or salinity levels prior to development in the
basin. Before the construction of Hoover Dam, salinity
levels in the Lower Basin fluctuated wildly during a
given year in inverse relation to the flow: during
periods of high runoff, the salinity level was extremely
low; when the flow diminished, the salinity level
increased dramatically. Construction of Hoover Dam, in
addition to preventing destructive flooding and providing
a reliable, year-round source of supply, provided the
Lower Basin with water supply relatively uniform in
salinity content. As a result, California and Arizona
were able to develop a year-round agricultural base, the
principal crops of which were dependent upon water fairly
low in salinity. As significant development in the Upper
Basin began in the 1950s and 1960s, the average salinity
level of the Colorado River began to rise. In the late
1960s and early 1970s leaders at the regional and
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national levels began to recognize the problem and to
seek solutions.
B. Selected Legislation Pertaining to Salinity
Control
It was actually a Lower Basin project that
first made salinity a major issue. In the 1930s and
19405 salt buildup in the groundwater of southern Arizona
had led to a reduction of farming in the Wellton-Mohawk
area. This prompted the importation of cleaner Colorado
River water in the mid-1950s under a federal project.
Importation of this new water, however, resulted in a
rise in the salt-laden groundwater table which prompted
an additional federal project to pump the saline ground-
water and discharge it out of the area to the Colorado
River just north of the Mexican border. The effects of
this salt loading were exacerbated when the filling of
Lake Powell behind the Glen Canyon Dam reduced flows in
the Lower Basin. By 1961 saline concentrations of about
6000 mg/L in the drainage water of this area caused the
Colorado River water flowing to Mexico to reach 2700
mg/L. Mexico claimed this water was ruining its crops
and also that the Mexico Treaty was being violated.
Although the Mexican Treaty contains no express
water-quality guarantee, after extended negotiations and
two interim agreements, on August 30, 1973, the United
States and Mexico reached an accord. Under Minute 242
of the International Boundary and Water Commission, the
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United States agreed that about 1.36 m.a.f. of the water
delivered to Mexico above the Morelos Dam would maintain
an average annual salinity of not more than 115 parts per
million, plus or minus 30 parts per million, over the
average annual salinity at Imperial Dam. Under this
standard, the salt content of the Mexican water would
generally be limited to about 1000 parts per million.
In 1974 Congress enacted the Salinity Control Act
not only to implement this international accord, but also
to undertake a basin-wide program to control salinity in
the Colorado River. The Salinity Control Act initially
authorized the construction of four salinity control
projects and has been amended to authorize numerous
others. The largest project is a desalinization plant
at Yuma, Arizona, which has cost at least $500 million
to construct thus far. The Act also sanctions an array
of other methods to control salinity, including canal
lining, projects to reduce the flow of particularly
saline irrigation water, and the circumvention or
deflection of saline water from natural sources. The
projects are to be financed by the federal government,
but repaid in part from money in the Upper Colorado River
Basin Fund and the Lower Colorado River Basin Development
Fund.
In 1972 Congress enacted amendments to the Federal
Water Pollution Control Act, commonly known as the Clean
Water Act. This Act sets forth a public policy embracing
-25-
the restoration and maintenance of water quality,
pollution effluent discharge limitations, and eventual
zero pollution discharge. The Act was interpreted by the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) as requiring for
the Colorado River water quality standards, numeric
salinity criteria, and a plan of implementation. The
basin states organized themselves in 1973 into the
Colorado River Basin Salinity Control Forum (Forum). The
Forum, made up of representatives from the seven Basin
states, established numeric criteria at three stations
and a plan of implementation that described actions to
be taken to achieve the numeric criteria.
The criteria, set in terms of milligrams per liter
of total dissolved solids, are:
Annual Flow-Weighted
Location	 Average TDS (Mg/L) 
Below Hoover Dam	 723
Below Parker Dam	 747
At Imperial DAm	 879
These standards reflect the river's salinity levels in
1972. It must be realized that they are relatively
arbitrary and were selected more as a political expedient
than as a result of any technical environmental or
economic analysis. A careful reevaluation of these
standards could result in their either being relaxed or
tightened. A relaxation could enhance damages from
salinity and complicate the United States' relationship
with Mexico. On the other hand, tightening the standard
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could increase substantially the costs of salinity
control and very possibly reduce or eliminate
opportunities for further development in the Upper Basin.
C.	 Choices to be Made
Salinity is one of the major obstacles to
further development of the waters of the Colorado River.
Three principal factors determine the salinity level of
the water: development, mostly in the Upper Basin;
runoff; and land and water management practices affecting
the natural and human-caused sources of salt. Although
two of these factors - development and salinity control
measures - can be controlled, runoff, while it might be
altered, remains a function largely beyond human control.
While many choices have already been made concerning
salinity control, these choices must be reviewed and
reevaluated periodically. Also, limits on the choices
exist which constrain action.
A principal constraint is uncertainty about how salt
loading and transport actually works. Although the costs
of monitoring and studying that process may be
prohibitively high since much of it occurs underground
and out of sight, additional research in this area could
yield information that ultimately would save money in the
selection and implementation of salinity control
measures. Additionally, past choices constrain future
ones. Early development proceeded with little attention
paid to the effects downstream. To now come in and upset
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the status quo by requiring water users to shut down or
pay for their salt-producing operations is unacceptable
to many; but if new rules were to apply only to
prospective users, this would seem unfair to them. Heavy
past irrigation in salt loading areas would make it
difficult to retire that farmland, even assuming that
this would be a desirable choice, regardless of whether
selective retirement would be the most economical
approach to salt control.
Political constraints also exist. The wisdom of
federal control over private land use is highly
debatable. Local governments in rural areas generally
do not favor land use regulations to prescribe on-farm
practices. The traditional method is voluntary,
publicly-assisted cost-sharing programs of soil and water
conservation.
Three basic issues must be decided:
1. What are the acceptable levels of salinity
along the Colorado River?
2. How should those levels be achieved and main-
tained?
3. Who should pay for the costs of salinity
control programs, and how?
IV. EFFECT OF THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT ON WATER
DEVELOPMENT IN THE UPPER COLORADO RIVER BASIN
The Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531 et
seq. (1985), was enacted by Congress in 1973 to provide
a means to conserve the ecosystems upon which endangered
and threatened species depend. The Act has had the
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effect of forestalling water development projects in the
Upper Basin and denying persons of their legal right to
divert water according to state water law. The terms of
the Act and actions taken pursuant to it must be examined
to understand how this has occurred.
A. The Endangered Species Act
The Act expressly declares that federal
agencies are to cooperate with state and local agencies
to resolve water resources issues in concert with the
conservation of endangered species. Id. § 1531(c)(2).
Section 1536(a)(2) provides that each federal agency
shall insure that any action authorized, funded, or
carried out by the agency is not likely to jeopardize the
continued existence of any endangered or threatened
species or result in the destruction or adverse modifica-
tion of habitat of such species which is determined to
be critical by the Secretary of the Interior, unless the
agency has been granted an exemption for the action.
"Action" includes the construction or funding of projects
and the issuance of 404 or right-of-way permits.
An exemption may be obtained if the Endangered
Species Committee determines that: 1) there are no
reasonable and prudent alternatives to the agency action;
2) the benefits of the action clearly outweigh the
benefits of alternative courses of action consistent with
conserving the species or its critical habitat, and such
action is in the public interest; 3) the action is of
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regional or national significance; and 4) neither the
agency nor the applicant made any irreversible or
irretrievable commitment of resources which has the
effect of foreclosing the formulation or implementation
of any reasonable and prudent alternative measures. The
Endangered Species Committee must also establish reason-
able mitigation and enhancement measures, such as live
propagation, transplantation, and habitat acquisition and
improvement, as are necessary and appropriate to minimize
the adverse effects of the agency action upon the
particular endangered species, threatened species, or
critical habitat concerned.
Following passage of the Act, three native fishes
in the Upper Colorado River Basin were listed as
endangered species: the Colorado squawfish, the bonytail
chub, and the humpback chub. In 1981, the Windy Gap
Project was subjected to consultation under section 1536
by the United States Fish and Wildlife Service
("Service"). Its sponsor, the Northern Colorado Water
Conservancy District, ultimately negotiated a settlement
in which it agreed to fund conservation measures to
offset any potential adverse effects the project
depletions may have on the endangered species' habitat.
This approach was subsequently used in over 40 consulta-
tions with the Service. The approach served two
purposes: it provided a means for generating the funding
necessary to conduct studies to define the needs of
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endangered or threatened species, and also allowed water
development projects to proceed.
In 1983, the Service defined minimum flows on the
Colorado River, Green River, Yampa River, White River,
and Gunnison River as being necessary to maintain the
habitats of endangered species. Any project that would
cause depletions below those minimum flow levels would
receive a jeopardy opinion from the Service. In response
to this action, the Colorado Water Congress, at the
request of several water users on the Colorado, South
Platte, and Arkansas Rivers, sponsored a project seeking
a way to continue water development projects in the Upper
Basin without violating the provisions of the Endangered
Species Act. In March 1984 the Service organized a
federal/state coordinating committee to resolve the
conflict between section 1536 consultations and future
Upper Basin water development. After two years of
extensive fact finding and intensive negotiations, a
proposal was developed which provided a means of
protecting the habitat of endangered species under state
water law while at the same time allowing water develop-
ment projects to proceed in the Upper Basin in accordance
with state water law and interstate compacts. The
proposal also called for the full recovery and delisting
of endangered native fishes in the Upper Basin within a
15-year time frame.
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The proposal was based upon four fundamental
principles:
1. Provision and maintenance of
instream flows at certain times,
locations, and in certain quan-
tities is necessary to protect
and recover endangered fish
species and habitat in the Upper
Colorado River Basin.
2. Water for instream flows will
be provided as part of a com-
prehensive recovery program that
addresses the Upper Basin and
fish species habitat needs as
a system.
3. Recovery and protection of rare
species is to be a shared
responsibility of the Federal
government, the States, water
and power users, and environ-
mental organizations. This
means, among other things, that
the cost of providing instream
flows and other recovery activi-
ties will be shared by these
parties.
4. Water rights for instream flows
established under this process
will be appropriated, acquired,
and administered pursuant to
State law and will therefore be
legally protected as any water
right under State laws. Where
water rights for instream flows
cannot be obtained, they will
be protected through contracts
or administrative agreements
with holders of appropriate
water rights. In no case shall
the Federal government condemn
water rights for the purpose of
protecting endangered species.
Pitts, A Proposal: Resolving the Conflict Between the
Endanaered Species Act and Water Development in the Upper
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Colorado River Basin, Colorado Water Rights, Vol. 5, No.
3 (Summer 1986). On January 21 and 22, 1988, the Secre-
tary of the Interior, the Administrator of the Western
Area Power Administration, and the Governors of Colorado,
Utah, and Wyoming signed the "Cooperative Agreement for
Recovery Implementation Program for Endangered Fish
Species in the Upper Colorado River Basin" ("Recovery
Program"), thus implementing the proposal developed two
years earlier.
B. Recovery Program
Under the Recovery Program, obtaining,
administering, and protecting instream minimum flows are
part of an overall recovery program, not the responsi-
bility of any particular water project sponsor as it was
under the former "Windy Gap" approach. Because the
Recovery Program provides a mechanism to assure that
instream flows are acquired and protected according to
state water law, the Service will consider this, under
any section 1536 consultation for a water project, as
offsetting project depletion impacts. Thus, project
related depletion impacts on all river reaches will not
jeopardize endangered species. Water project sponsors
are required to make a one-time financial contribution
of ten dollars per acre foot of average annual depletion
to support the Recovery Program. For water projects
causing direct impacts in occupied habitat, such as
obstruction to migration routes or adverse physical
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alteration of occupied habitat, the Recovery Program
directs the Secretary of the Interior to suggest
reasonable and prudent alternatives to offset those
impacts and avoid a jeopardy situation. Projects causing
only depletion impacts in nonoccupied habitat are to
receive non-jeopardy opinions pending the project's
financial support of the Recovery Program.
Because of the Recovery Program, water project
sponsors will receive "no jeopardy" opinions regarding
impacts to endangered species. This is the principal
mechanism by which conflicts between future water
development and endangered species protection have been
resolved. Environmentalists have objected to this
feature of the Recovery Program because to date specific
water rights have not been put in place for endangered
fish species habitat. The Service is also concerned
about issuing "no jeopardy" opinions based on the premise
that flows are available to offset project impacts when
those flows are not yet available. To address this
concern, the Service has proposed to issue preliminary
"no jeopardy" opinions under the Recovery Program and to
simultaneously monitor progress made toward obtaining
flows for endangered fish species. The "no jeopardy"
opinion would then be reviewed prior to any irretrievable
commitments of resources by the project sponsors. If the
Service determines that insufficient progress has been
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made, it will identify other conservation measures to
offset the proposed project's impact.
The Recovery program specifies the procedures by
which the flow needs of endangered species are to be
determined. To date the Service has made preliminary
recommendations for the flow needs on the Yampa River and
the 15-mile stretch of the Colorado River between the
Grand Valley Diversion and the Gunnison River. An
initial review of these recommendations, however, indi-
cated that they were lacking in scientific justification
and the Service is in the process of revising them.
Water users generally believe that flow recommendations
should be related to the needs of the endangered Species
and scientifically justified. They should also take into
account the historic availability of water.
The problem with defining flow needs for endangered
species is the considerable degree of uncertainty
associated with the use of biological date to complete
this task. Additionally, such data is very difficult to
collect on large river systems, such as the Colorado
River. Additional work needs to be done in this area.
V. CONCLUSION
The 1922 Compact, the cornerstone of the law of the
river, materialized principally as a result of a fear of
a recurrence of floods that devastated part of the lower
Colorado River in 1905-07 and again in 1916. Ironically,
the conditions which has most troubled the law of the
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river since its inception has been the contrary: an
insufficient supply of water to satisfy all entitlements.
The super-imposing of international and national obli-
gations and environmental policies upon the law of the
river, which essentially is a series of "contracts" to
share a common supply of water, is propelling those
dependent upon this water towards an eventual show-down.
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